The “formal” beginning of the “Basmachi” movement is usually associated with the Czarist Imperial Decree of 25 June 1916, which ordered the first non-voluntary recruitment of Central Asians into the army during the First World War. The movement was a reaction not only to conscription, but to the Russian conquest itself and the policies employed by the Czarist state in that region. Although it is primarily Russian sources and officialdom who used the term “Basmachi” –and almost exclusively to denigrate the movement– to the Central Asians, it was an Action for National Liberation, and so referred.
Zeki Velidi Togan (1890-1970) was a professor of history for over half a century. He taught and earned academic degrees and rank in the institutions of higher learning on three continents, including the U.S. Early in his career, Togan had been a principal leader of the Turkistan National Liberation Movement (Turkistan National Liberation Movement) in Central Asia (1916- 1930s). He therefore belongs, along with the Ukrainian professor Michael Hrushevs’kyj (1866-1934), and the Czechoslovak professor Thomas Masaryk (1850-1937), to an unusual group of distinguished historical persona. All three endeavored to write the history of their nations, and took time away from their respective libraries to secure intellectual, cultural, civil and political independence for their polities. A Central Asian himself and a principal leader of the Turkistan National Liberation Movement, Togan described the sources of the Movement as follows:
“Basmachi is derived from “baskinji,” meaning attacker, which was first applied to bands of brigands. During Czarist times, these bands existed when independence was lost and Russian domination began in Turkmenistan, Bashkurdistan and the Crimea. Bashkurts [in Russian language sources: “Bashkir”] called them “ayyar,” by the Khorasan term. In Crimea and, borrowed from there, in Ukraine, “haydamak” was used. Among Bashkurts such heroes as Buranbay became famous; in Crimea, there was [a leader named] Halim; and in Samarkand, Namaz. These did not bother the local native population but sacked the Russians and the Russian flour-mills, distributing their booty to the population. In Ferghana, these elements were not extinct at the beginning of 1916.
…. after the proliferation of cotton planting in Ferghana [imposed by the Czarist state at the expense of cereal cultivation] the economic conditions deteriorated further. This increased brigandage. Among earlier Basmachi, as was the case in Turkey, the spiritual inspiration of the Uzbek and Turkmen bands was the dastan of K’roþlu. Basmachi of Bukhara, Samarkand, Jizzakh and Turkmen gathered at nights to read K’roþlu and other dastans [ornate oral histories]. What has the external appearance of brigandage is actuality a reflection and representation of the thoughts and spirit of a wide segment of the populace. Akchuraoglu Yusuf Bey reminds us that during the independence movements of the Serbians, the “h”dk;” the “kleft;” and “palikarya” of the Greeks comprised half nationalist revolutionaries and half brigands.
The majority and the most influential of the Basmachi groups founded after 1918 did not at all follow the K’roþlu tradition, but were composed of serious village leadership and sometimes the educated. Despite that, all were labeled Basmachi. Consequently, in Turkistan, these groups were regarded as partisans; more especially representing the guerilla groups fighting against the colonial power. Nowadays, in the ™Uzbek and Kazak press, one reads about Chinese, Algerian and Indian Basmachi [the references are to the respective anti-colonial movements].”
In the last paragraph above, Togan refers to the politically experienced personnel entering into the movement. Among them, of course, he was one. In light of his published memoirs, this infusion, he infers, updated the methods of the struggle. This included activity not confined to armed struggle.
A Baskurt-Turk, (in Russian sources, Bashkir) Togan’s his first book is entitled Trk and Tatar History [Trk ve Tatar Tarihi] (Kazan, 1911). As one result, Togan received invitations from renowned scholars of Oriental studies such as N. Ashmarin (1870-1933), N. Katanov (1862-1922), both of the Kazan University, and Wilhelm Bartold (1869-1930) of St. Petersburg University, to study with them. During 1913, Togan was asked by the Archeology and Ethnography Society of Kazan University to undertake a research trip to Trkistan. After successful completion of that endeavor, the Imperial Russian Academy of Sciences, jointly with International Central Asia Research Society, sponsored Togan for a more detailed expedition. Portions of Togan’s findings began to be published in related scholarly journals prior to the First World War. His lifetime output approaches four hundred individual items, in at least five languages. He also had facility in several other languages.
Prof. A. Inan, a close colleague of Togan –both as a historian and as a member of the Turkistan National Liberation Movement– provides an observation to demonstrate how seriously Togan took his scholarly activities, even after Togan became the primus inter pares in the Turkistan National Liberation Movement. The event takes place during June 1922, in the vicinity of Samarkand:
When a Bolshevik military unit, detailed to liquidate us, opened fire, we took refuge in a nearby cemetery. As we began defending ourselves, I noticed that Togan had taken out his ever-present notebook and was busily scribbling. The circumstances were so critical, some of those among our ranks even thought that he was hurriedly recording his last will and testament. He kept writing, seemingly oblivious to the flying bullets aimed at him, and the accompanying sounds of war. I shouted at him from behind the tombstone that was protecting me, and asked why he was not fighting. Without looking up, continuing to write, he shouted back: “You keep firing. The inscriptions on these headstones are very interesting.”
The Czarist advance toward Central Asia began in the 16th century, with the fall of Kazan in 1552. The Czarist bureaucracy was organized to continue the eastward expansion, while relevant governmental ministries and divisions were created. For example, in the 18th century the Imperial Academy of Sciences and the St. Petersburg University had an “Asiatic Cabinet” with the assigned task of understanding the conditions in Central Asian. (Indeed, the said Asiatic Cabinet was inherited from earlier Czarist efforts, established by Ivan Grozny). In the 1860s the Czarist Imperial Staff in 1860s included a specific “Asiatic department” to prepare war plans, aimed at occupying Central Asia. Middle level schools were established to train lower level functionaries to work in Customs and tax collection posts. The church bureaucracy prepared for the salvation of Central Asian souls by founding two university-level Orthodox seminaries. The office of School Inspectors became as powerful as civil governorships in Central Asia. By 1865, Tashkent was in the hands of Czarist to St. Petersburg, situated adjacent to two older and senior military districts to the west: Orenburg and Transcaucasia in Tbilisi. By mid 1880s, the last portion of Central Asia that until then escaped occupation, the Turkmen, were militarily brought within the borders of the Czarist empire.
The Czarist generals were over ambitious, eager for personal glory, and forcibly exceeded the occupation timetable. That schedule was primarily drawn up by the Czarist finance ministry. To head-off international criticism, Russia’s purported “civilizing mission” in Central Asia is articulated in Czarist Foreign Minister Gorchakov’s famous Memorandum of 1864 to the Czarist diplomatic corps. It was meant to be the justification or explanation to be provided all governments around the world for the Czarist expansion into Central Asia. This was probably inspired by the words of Kipling’s “White Man’s Burden” as utilized by other colonial powers. In 1875, a high level Russian functionary frankly outlined the Czarist Russia’s true motivations of economic exploitation and recovery of prestige in Turkistan. Since 1826, the British were closely, and with concern, watching the Russian advance towards the British India. This was a component of the Great Game in Asia.
The foundations of Basmachi objectives
Apart from the initial uprising associated with the 1916 Decree, the Turkistan National Liberation Movement leadership had in mind the objective of establishing the Turkistan Republic. They had in mind historical models, such as the Timurids. The nature of the proposed, or longed for independent Turkistan is detailed in the political party platforms and declarations drawn up for the purpose during 1916-1922. The Bolsheviks took this Turkistan National Liberation Movement basic plan, and used it to form the Turkistan SSR in 1921. In the short term, this was a Bolshevik calculation to mollify the Basmachi, and to remove support for Basmachi among the local population. The Bolsheviks proved that point in 1924 by dissolving the Turkistan SSR and various other appendages and creating the USSR.
According to Togan, this region was known as Turkistan as far back as the written records allow. Bartold, in his 1900 doctoral dissertation entitled Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasions largely concurs. At this point, the question “what constituted the essence of Turkistan?” immediately presents itself. The nature of the population was one indicator. Their cultural, political and economic modes, collectively and inseparably, was another.
Polities that are insulated by natural barriers from their neighbors more readily coagulate into “nations” and “states.” These polities tend to form and maintain their political and cultural states around a specific ethnicity, and traditions. The incursions from the “outside” are less often than that occurs on a continental scale. Ireland, Great Britain and Japan, among others, may serve as examples. But, on the Asian continent polities are adjacent in contiguous tracts. The geography comprises vast expanses, with demanding climactic conditions. This causes the politics to evolve in a bit more complicated fashion. A culture heavily dependent on horses is much more fluid. They are very mobile. Neighbors can come calling at short notice, and may not leave for a long time. Cultural contact ensues. Polities may change character or even structure as one result. Which, in brief, is what has been happening in the heart of Asia, for close to two millennia has often been termed Turkistan.
Not all corners of the Asian continent is lush with tropical forests, nor is all land arable or suitable for agriculture. Large areas, especially in the center of Asia, are designated bozkir, supporting limited vegetation, mostly saksaul (Holoxylon Ammodendron). Rainfall is exceedingly rare, and benefits mostly small irrigated patches where cities are located. All are separated with sizeable deserts such as Karakum, Kizilkum, Gobi, Taklamakan. In these conditions, family units must depend on each other for survival. This they did largely by engaging in animal husbandry, primarily horses and sheep. These species provided the basic necessities of life in the bozkir, including the fibers to produce clothing and shelter (not to mention food and drink). Anyone attempting to live alone, could hardly see the next spring in the harsh continental climate. Similarly, a single family, regardless of how large it might be, could not survive without other kinsmen. The Central Asians, as one consequence, have highly developed vocabulary to define social relations and familial ties. Thus, we observe that a pyramidal structure constitutes the bases of the broad community in Central Asia. It has a defined set of steps. An uruk is comprised of oymak, which are made up of aris, a composition of soy, itself a subdivided into tire, constituted by ara: uruk > oymak > arþs > soy > tire > ara
In times of political strain, when war clouds are visible, various uruk form coalitions and establish the ultimate political and economic union: the confederation. The Central Asians termed this process “tuþ baþlamak.” Tuþ is the horse-tail standard. The leader of a polity or unit had the traditional right to tie a tuþ to his lance. (As the tuþ would be more visible than a naked lance, this tuþ was used to identify the polity and, when needed, to signal the cavalry, to order various attacking, flanking, retreat and regrouping signals). When the leader in question attracted more of his kinsmen to his standard, he would be in a position to add additional tuþ to his own lance. This was necessary because he now had more divisions to command, each with a designated lieutenant, called tuþbay. For example, in the very late 15th and very early 16th centuries, the Uzbeks and the Kazaks formed their confederations in this time-honored fashion. In the 14th century, Timur was another example. Their population comprised primarily of uruk, oymak, aris and so on, that arrived from the Nogay confederation which was beginning to dissolve. This was the mechanics by which the Central Asians established their polities, which we might now call states, complete with their geographic domains and governance structures.
The name adopted as the appellation of the confederation is chosen carefully, as it determines the character of the polity. For example, Uzbeks named themselves after Uzbek Han. This took place after an earlier confederation was dissolved, and the components of that earlier confederation chose to join others to form a new confederation. Togan, in his “Origins of the Uzbeks and the Kazaks” summarizes the process:
The nomadic populace of the entire Desht-i Kipchak [Kipchak steppe], from the Tarbagatay mountains to the Syr Darya River, and from Khorezm to the Idil [Volga] basin and Crimea, were termed “Togmak” during the era of the Mongols, prior to the spread of Islam. Among the Khiva Uzbeks, the term (in Eblgazi) known as “Togma”; Baskurts “Tuvma;” Nogay (according to the Cevdet Pasha history), “Tokma” designated individuals without a known lineage, or fugitives to be sold as slaves, being offenders of the law. The negative connotation ascribed to this term, generally referencing the Kipchaks and Altin Orda (Golden Horde) Tatars, must have occurred after the spread of Islam. It is not known that the Jochi Ulus utilized that appellation. It appears that this tribe, known as “Togmak,” had been designated as “Uzbek” after “Uzbek Khan” (1312-1340). According to Bartold, the terms “Uzbek” and “Uzbek Ulus” have been utilized in Central Asia to distinguish this tribe and its entire military population from the “Chaghatay”; until the dissolution of the Altin Orda during the fifteenth century, and the dissemination of its uruk as Uzbek, Kazak, and Nogay Ulus. Their identifying uran (battle cry) was the word alach.
Each polity would choose an uran as a part of their membership kit. The Uran is the word shouted in the heat of the battle, to allow combatants to identify and gauge the whereabouts of their fellows without taking their eyes off the common adversary. The uran serves as the general password of the members of a polity, as seen for example, with the Nogay. The utterance of the uran (during the act of the strike, of the motion of the sword, to release the pressure on the diaphragm) marked the membership in a given polity as well as access to other members not personally acquainted in non-combat times. Thus, uran is an integral part of identity in Central Asia, forming a triad, along with tamga and dastan.
The term tamga, originally referring to the “seal” of a given group, was later borrowed by Russians to designate customs levies (Russian: tamozhnia). The tamga was embroidered on Central Asian tents, incorporated into rugs, filigreed into jewelry, struck into coins, and used as a cattle brand. A list of early tamgas is found in Kashgarli Mahmut’s eleventh century work the Diwan Lugat at Trk. It provides, in part, the visual identification component of the membership in the polity.
A dastan, on the other hand is an ornate “oral history” of the origins, customs, practices, and exploits of ancestors. It was a shameful act on the part of any member who could not recite a portion of the designated dastan. The dastan contains the kernel of the events that gave birth to the polity.
As one result, the triad uran, tamga, dastan comprise, if you will, the constitution, passport and national anthem of the confederation. Together, they form the emblems of a polity, or statehood. This triad was always used by Central Asian polities, even after large-scale Central Asian empires, city-states or other smaller entities, dissolved. The triad lay dormant for a period, until new conditions favorable for another confederation presented themselves. It happened in the fifth to seventh centuries A.D., when the G”ktrk empire rose from its earlier roots, and even after the thirteenth century Mongol irruption as the Timurid empire demonstrates. In the twentieth century, this triad began to make itself felt once again. In the political party platforms of the proposed Turkistan independent republic, the traces of these elements are discernible. Much like the Australian colonies confederating in 1901 to form Australia, or the American colonies in 1776 making use of earlier symbolisms and traditions, forming coalitions.
The leaders of the Turkistan National Liberation Movement took on the historical title Korbashi, as recorded in the eleventh century, meaning “commander of defense troops,” and set about engaging the colonizer and preparing for sovereignty. Until 1921, unprecedented developments favored the Turkistan National Liberation Movement, for this was no ordinary uprising. It was structured. The Movement possessed an elaborate high level intelligence gathering organization, military units, education department, historical roots and precedence. It could be said that if it was not for the intervention of the Second World War, the movement would not have been extinguished in its outward form. At least two monuments in the former Soviet Republic of Kazakhstan suggest continued military clashes between the Turkistan National Liberation Movement forces and the Red Army well into the 1930s.
But, during the First World War, which coincided with the beginnings of the Movement as well as providing a part of the impetus, the primary reason revolved around another international phenomenon. Turkistan was entirely isolated from the rest of the world, one might say by a cordon sanitaire, by colonial powers who did not wish to see their own colonies gain independence. Even if the colonizer Czarists were not, at that moment, in charge in Turkistan, other colonizing powers were hesitant to allow any colony to gain independence. “Allowing” one group to gain independence, the colonial powers feared, would “infect”others. (The 1905 Russo-Japanese clearly demonstrated to the Asians that an Asian power could defeat a “western” power. Indo-China, India and their neighbors absorbed that lesson). Ironically, even this sacrificing of Central Asia at the altar of colonialism did not save colonialism. A few years after the sacrifice of Turkistan, all colonies and colonial empires began unraveling.
This militarily effected cordon sanitaire around Turkistan negatively influenced not only the proposed international contacts of the Central Asians, but also their economics. The economic structure imposed on Turkistan by the Czarist bureaucracy had to be abandoned as soon as practical. Czarist imposed system was forcing Central Asia to devote all of its fertile soil to cotton cultivation. This was done to require Turkistan to import its food from other Russian held territories. The Turkistan National Liberation Movement leadership was preparing for independent international trade and diplomatic contacts by training a select group of young women and men. Accordingly, by 1924, a number of Turkistan students were already sent to study in western European countries, mostly in Germany. When the first wave of those selected to be the “contact people” and diplomatic-economic “coordinators” earned their degrees and returned to Turkistan, they met with tragedy. All were “liquidated” under deplorable conditions by the Stalinists in the newly formed Soviet Union. The second wave wisely chose to stay away, and alive, to continue the struggle, even if from afar. The details of those initiatives were recorded in a series of political party platforms. Those programs display a character not unlike a Declaration of Independence with many prominent examples.
The Turkistan National Liberation Movement is very much an indigenous initiative begun for the purpose of “…control of land and social space…” as Roman Sporluk defines the term “nationalism.” Turkistan National Liberation Movement was borne of a yearning for an independent, sovereign state. The proposed structure, as outlined in the political documents issued by the Movement, shows an understanding of both the internal and the external realities. They sought to preserve and maintain their culture in all spheres of life, while integrating into the world at large. They wished to be the mediators of their own culture. The struggle was to resuscitate what was theirs, but temporarily lost. Much like, for example, the disappearance and re-birth of Poland on the same soil. All this they were seeking to realize without an inquisition-like coercion, which was actually imposed on them during the Soviet period, but by free association. Even after the Second World War, all this was not entirely understood by the world at large.
In the aftermath of 1991, there are many indications that the cordon sanitaire of the earlier era is not entirely broken. Which is one reason why some of the earlier demands and proposed remedies are beginning to re-emerge in the present.
I would like to thank Professor Irene Masing-Delic, and Dr. Bill Wolf (respectively the Director, and the Associate Director) of the Center for Slavic and East European Studies of The Ohio State University; and Professor Alam Payind, Director, Middle East Studies Center, The Ohio State University.
1. The following publications provide bibliographies and commentary, from different perspectives, on the general topic at hand:
H. B. Paksoy, “The Basmachi Movement From Within: An Account of Zeki Velidi Togan” Nationalities Papers Vol. 23, No 2. June 1995. Pp. 373-399. [Reprinted in Turkistan Newsletter (ISSN: 1386-6265) Vol. 97-1: November 1997];
Idem, “The ‘Basmachi'” (Turkistan National Liberation Movement 1916-1930s) Modern Encyclopedia of Religions in Russia and Soviet Union [MERRSU] (Academic International Press, 1991) Vol. IV. Pp. 5-20. [Reprinted in Turkistan Newsletter Vol. 97-1: October 1997]
Idem, “Z. V. Togan: the Origins of the Kazaks and the Uzbeks” Central Asian Survey Vol. 11, No. 3. 1992. Pp. 83-100. [Reprinted in CENTRAL ASIA READER: The Rediscovery of History H. B. Paksoy, Editor, Translator. (New York/London: M. E. Sharpe, 1994) 201 Pp. + Index
Idem, “‘Basmacþ’ ve 1916-1924 Trkistan Baþþmsþzlþk Savaþþ” Yeni Forum Vol. 14, No. 293, Ekim 1993. Pp. 9-17. [Reprinted in H. B. Paksoy, TšRK TARIHI, TOPLUMLARIN MAYASI, UYGARLIK (Izmir: Mazhar Zorlu Holding, 1997) Kltr Sanat Yayþnþ. 165 Pp.
Idem, “An Encounter Between Z. V. Togan (1890-1970) and S. Freud” STAD: Sanal Turkoloji Araþtþrmalarþ Dergisi (ISSN: 1301-9155), 1, 19 May 1998. [Reprinted in International Bulletin of Political Psychology (ISSN: 1094-6039) Vol.4, No. 24; June 19, 1998]
Idem, “Chora Batþr: A Tatar Admonition to Future Generations.” Studies in Comparative Communism Vol. XIX, Nos. 3 & 4, Autumn/Winter 1986. Pp. 253-265. [Translation in Kþrþm Dergisi 3, 1993. Dr. Tevhide Sel, Tr.]
Idem, “Introduction.” (as Special Editor of “Muslims in the Russian Empire: Response to Conquest”) Studies in Comparative Communism Vol. XIX, Nos. 3 & 4, Autumn/Winter 1986. Pp. 247-251.
Idem, “Perspectives on the Unrest in the Altai Region of the USSR” RFE/RL Report on the USSR (Electronic version, on SOVSET) 10 September 1990. [Printed in Eurasian Studies Vol. 2, No. 2 Summer 1995. Pp. 94-96]
Idem, “Sun is also Fire.” AACAR Bulletin (of the Association for the Advancement of Central Asian Research) Vol. VII, No. 2; Fall 1994. [Reprinted from Central Asian Monuments, H. B. Paksoy, Ed. (Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1992). Pp. 1-33.]
Idem, “Nationality or Religion? Views of Central Asian Islam” AACAR Bulletin (of the Association for the Advancement of Central Asian Research) Vol. VIII, No. 2; Fall 1995. [Translation in Central Asia and the Gulf. Masayuki Yamauchi, Ed. (Tokyo: Asahi Selected Series, 1995). Pp. 17-67 + Notes: 1-15].
Idem, “Elements of Humor in Central Asia: The Example of the journal Molla Nasreddin in Azarbaijan.” Turkestan als historischer Faktor und politische Idee. Baymirza Hayit Festschrift. Prof. Dr. Erling von Mende (Ed.) (K”ln: Studienverlag, 1988.). Pp. 164-180.
“US and Bolshevik Relations with the TBMM Government: The First Contacts, 1919-1921.” The Journal of Sophia Asian Studies No. 12 (1994). Pp. 211-251. [Reprinted in Turkistan Newsletter In three parts: Vol:97-1:24a1; 24a2; 24a3–in electronic format. 19 July 1997]
2. Some editions are available in the US libraries: K”roglu ve Dadaloglu, Cahit Uztelli (Ed.) (Ankara, 1952); K”roglu, M. H. Tahmasib (Ed.) (Baku, 1975); [K’roglu] G’roglu, D. Haldurdi (Ed.) Ashkhabad, 1980); K’roglu Antep Rivayeti, Hseyin Bayaz (Ed.) (Istanbul, 1981); [K”roglu] G”r-Ogli, B. A. Karriev (Ed.) (Moscow, 1983).
3. As he refers to himself on several occasions, including in his memoirs.
4. Despite their names, neither was Russian, but both had been baptized. Togan was personally acquainted with these individuals and refers to Katanov as a Sagay-Turk from the Altai region, and to Ashmarin, as a Chuvash-Turk. N. Poppe, Introduction to Altaic Linguistics (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1965) Ural- Altaische Bibliothek XIV, Pp. 104-105 agrees with Togan that Katanov is a Sagai Turk. Cf. S. N. Ivanov, Nikolai Federovich Katanov 1862-1962, Ocherk zhizni i deyatelnosti (Moscow-Leningrad, 1962). On the Other hand, Poppe states that Nikolai Ivanovich Ashmarin (1870-1933) was a Russian, working on Chuvash. Cf. V. G. Egorov, N. I. Ashmarin kak issledovatel chuvasskogo yazika, K 75-letiyu so dnya rozdeniya (Cheboksari, 1948).
5. Bartold was a descendent of a German family settled in the Russian empire. Majority of the founding scholars comprising the Imperial Academy of Sciences and the universities were of non-Russian origin. For a description of the formation of the Academy, see Richard N. Frye, “Oriental Studies in Russia” in Russia and Asia: Essays on the Influence of Russia on the Asian Peoples, Wayne S. Vucinich (Ed.), Stanford, 1972.
6. In addition to Togan’s Hatiralar (Memoirs) (Istanbul, 1969), I made use of bibliographic material which appeared in Fen- Edebiyat Fakltesi Arastirma Dergisi Atatrk šniversitesi, Erzurum. Sayi 13, 1985; and information provided by his colleagues who worked with him, his students, and family friends.
7. Over the years, I have been told of this incident by several doctoral students and family friends of not only of Inan, but also of Togan, independent of each other. Later in life, it appears that the occasion caused numerous droll exchanges between Inan and Togan, and every time Inan mentioned the incident, Togan relished recounting an event about Inan’s being “wounded” at the same battle. Perhaps both men came to look upon those shared experiences with some detachment and as reminders of their exertions. They left Central Asia and endured arduous times together, in Asia and Europe, until events caused them to be separated. However, they became colleagues as faculty members in Istanbul University during the latter parts of their individual careers. Reportedly, each sent his students to the seminars of the other. At one occasion, towards the end of their lives, Inan became seriously ill. Togan asked his doctoral students to visit Inan at the hospital, and read passages from his own writings to him, especially the portion about “Inan’s wounding.”
8. Togan records the fighting in his memoirs, including Inan’s “wounding,” but not his own “note-taking.” He simply states he was “…reading the headstones written in the Kufi script.” See Hatiralar, 414. Togan identifies the location of the cemetery as Qala-i Ziyaeddin.
9. H. B. Paksoy, ALPAMYSH: Central Asian Identity Under Russian Rule (Hartford, Connecticut: AACAR, 1989). Association for the Advancement of Central Asian Research Monograph Series.
10. David McKenzie, “The Conquest and Administration of Turkestan, 1860-85” in Russian Colonial Expansion to 1917 Michael Rywkin, Ed. (London: Mansell, 1988); John LeDonne, The Russian Empire and the World, 1700-1917 (London: Oxford U. P., 1997); Alfred Rieber, “Persistent Factors in Russian Foreign Policy: an interpretive essay” Imperial Russian Foreign Policy Hugh Ragsdale, Ed. (Cambridge, 1993).
11. A copy is found in Sir Fraser-Tytler, Afghanistan, 2d ed. (Oxford, 1953).
12. M.A. Terentyef, Russia and England in Central Asia, F.C. Daukes, Tr. (Calcutta: Foreign Department Press, 1876), 2 vols. The original Russian edition of this work was published in St. Petersburg in 1875.
13. Charles Marvin, The Russian Advance Towards India (London, 1882).
14. See Central Asia Reader.
15. Z. V. Togan, Tr., Risala: Ibn Fadlan’s Reisebericht (Leipzig, 1939); Yakut-i Hamavi, Mujam al-Buldan (entry: Turkistan) (Beirut, 1957); J. Marquart, Eransahr nach der Geographie des Ps. Moses Xorenac’i (Berlin, 1901).
16. For more examples, from the 9th century, see C. E. Bosworth, The Gaznavids: Their Empire in Afghanistan and Eastern Iran, 994-1040 (Beirut, 1973) (2nd Ed.) and F. Smer, Oguzlar (Turkmenler) (Istanbul, 1980) (3rd. Ed.). Also, Lawrence Krader, Formation of the State (Prentice-Hall, 1968); idem, Social Organizations of the Mongol-Turkic Pastoral Nomads (NY: Humanities and The Hague, 1963) who very early warned that “western nationalism” hypotheses may not be applicable to Central Asia. Larry Moses and Stephen Halkovich, Introduction to Mongolian History and Culture (Bloomington: Indiana U. Press, 1985) Indiana University Uralic Altaic Series Vol. 149, outlined the Mongolian case in Central Asia.
17. Alfred Rehder, Manual of Cultivated Trees and Shrubs (NY: Macmillan, 1940).
18. Abulghazi Bahadir Khan (1603-1663), Secere-i Terakime (The Lineage of the Turks), completed in 1659. The French translation by Desmaisons is no longer satisfactory, for it lacks critical apparatus. An English translation is long overdue.
19. Cevdet Pasha (1822-1895) was an Ottoman historian,administrator, educational and judicial reformer. See Stanford J. and E.K. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), vol. II.
20. See Alpamysh: Central Asian Identity under Russian Rule.
21. Central Asia Reader.
22. See H. N. Orkun, Eski Trk Yazitlari (Istanbul, 1936) for the full text in the original “Orkhun” alphabet (Pp. 23-55). Texts in the Latin alphabet and English translations are found in T. Tekin, A Grammar of Orkhon Turkic (Indiana, 1968). The personal names of the editors of both works ought not be confused with those of the monuments themselves. The discussion on the general topic is nascent. See also Nazif Shahrani, “‘From Tribe to Umma’: Comments on the Dynamics of Identity in Muslim Central Asia” Central Asian Survey Vol. 3, No. 3 (1984).
23. Kasgarli Mahmud, Kitab Diwan Lugat at Turk Completed c. A. D. 1074?/ 1077. Editio Princeps by Kilisli Rifat (3 Vols.) (Istanbul, 1917-19). English Translation by R. Dankoff and J. Kelly as Compendium of Turkic Dialects (3 Vols.) (Cambridge, MA., 1982-84)}.
24. H. B. Paksoy, Review of Shirali Turdiev, Onlar Germaniyada Okugan Ediler [They Studied in Germany]. (Tashkent: Ozbekistan Respublikasþ Fanlar Akademiyasþ [Ozbek Republic Academy of Sciences], 1992) Fan Neshriyati, in Central Asian Survey Vol. 15, Number 3/4 December 1996. Pp. 442-444.
25. Roman Szporluk, “the National Question” in After the Soviet Union: from Empire to Nations Timothy Colton & Robert Legvold, Eds. (NY & London: W.W. Norton, 1992) Pp. 84-112.
26. See especially the events recounted at the end of “The ‘Basmachi'” (Turkistan National Liberation Movement 1916-1930s) cited in FN. 1. Further, for example, John Embree, “American Military Government” Social Structure: studies Presented to A. R. Radcliffe-Brown (NY: Russell & Russell, 1963). Second printing (first printing 1946?) outlining the endemic systemic difficulties encountered by the American academics and bureaucracy in understanding and studying other cultures in the post World War II period.